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The Intrusion of Private Law 
in Public Administration 
T. G.ISON 
Introduction 
The title of this panel is "Private Law — Public Law : Where Lies 
the Frontier". Thus the ostensible objective is to identify the boundary 
between private law and public law. Obviously someone is kidding. 
To accept that challenge would be like accepting an appointment 
to an inquiry commission established on a Pacific island to identify 
where the boundary lies between two tribes, when the evidence is that 
both tribes are nomadic, each covers the whole island in its wande-
rings, and neither claims any sector of the island as its own nor 
recognizes any sector as belonging to the other tribe. Moreover, there 
has been interbreeding between the tribes for at least a hundred years, 
and no reason is stated why a boundary is required. 
Rather than dwelling on perimeters or definitions, this paper 
attempts to explain some of the influences of private law in public 
administration. For this purpose, private law might be described 
roughly as that which covers transactions and inter-actions between 
individuals, particularly in regard to property, commerce, and the 
family. The areas of public law and administration of concern in this 
paper relate to the structure and operation of government, including 
the regulatory arod service roles of government, such as social 
insurance, transport and communications, schools, hospitals, environ-
mental control, and occupational health. 
The area of criminal law is not covered in this paper. 
Legal Education 
The influence of private law might be seen as beginning with the 
significance assigned to it in legal education. 
* Professor, Queen's University. 
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Twenty years ago, the typical law faculty curriculum was heavily 
weighted in the traditional private law subjects. Courses in public law 
were certainly included. For example, constitutional law held a central 
place, and there were generally courses on administrative law, labour, 
and tax, although these would sometimes be optional. It was common 
to find no courses at all in any field of social legislation. The offering in 
public law was impoverished compared with the range of private law 
courses that were available, and usually compulsory, particularly in 
property, commercial and financial subjects. 
In recent years, law faculties have developed a range of courses in 
various areas of public law. But these still tend to be seen in the 
profession as frills, and the law societies still press the universities to 
regard private law subjects as the hard core of legal education. 
The same emphasis appears in the articling system. The type of 
articling traditionally accepted by law societies required service with a 
lawyer in private practice. Here again there have been changes. In 
British Columbia, for example, students are now allowed to article 
with lawyers employed in government departments, or by boards or 
commissions. Unfortunately, however, this appears to have resulted 
from a shortage of articling positions in private practice ; not from a 
growing recognition in the profession of the importance of public law. 
Thus a student who articles in the public service is still required to 
show that his articles include some exposure in major areas of private 
law. But there is no corresponding requirement that a student articling 
in private practice must show a comparable exposure in major areas of 
public law. 
It is interesting to consider why this heavy emphasis on private 
law came about, and why it persists. One influence no doubt was the 
demand for legal services by those with the money to pay fees. Much 
of this demand related in the early development of the common law to 
the administration of property, and later to commerce and finance. 
But this does not explain why our law faculties were unable or 
unwilling to train lawyers for salaried positions in the public service, 
or for the roles that they often undertake as elected representatives. 
A possible explanation for the preponderance of private law 
might be that it reflects the influence of the Establishment on the legal 
profession, and on legal education. But this hardly seems credible, at 
least not as a decisive factor. Major corporations may dislike a great 
deal of regulatory legislation, but they probably have as much interest 
as anyone else in having an available supply of lawyers trained to 
understand it. 
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Another possible explanation might be seen in the goal orienta-
tion of contemporary society. The financial dependency of the 
communications media on advertising may seem to result in the 
promotion of maximum consumption as the paramount goal of 
human existence. It would be consistent with this that a support role in 
production and marketing could seem more virtuous for a lawyer than 
a role in public administration. 
In considering this hypothesis, it is interesting to compare our 
curricula with the curriculum of law students in another society where 
the goal orientation may have been different. Roman law at the time 
of its climax and codification in the Eastern Empire provides an 
example. The Institutes of Justinian purport to be a basic student text 
"comprising the first elements of the whole science of law".1 The 
prooemium concludes with an Imperial statement of the objective of 
legal education. 
Receive then these laws with your best powers and with eagerness of study, 
and show yourselves so learned as to be encouraged to hope that when you 
have compassed the whole field of law you may have ability to govern such 
portion of the state as may be entrusted to you.2 
One might expect that the curriculum for this elite corps of potential 
governors would contain mostly public law. But it was not so. The 
Institutes that follow contain a heavy preponderance of private law, 
and there is very little on public administration. 
Thus while contemporary goals or power structures may have 
some relevance, they do not seem to provide any obvious, convincing 
or total explanation for the preponderance of private law. Three other 
factors seem more significant. 
First, there may be a natural tendency for the perimeters of any 
discipline to become defined by the extent of available literature, 
rather than by philosophical analysis or by any pragmatic assessment 
of societal needs. In law, it was the process of litigation that generated, 
directly or indirectly, the most accessible literature in a fairly uniform 
style and covering a broad spectrum of subjects. This helps to explain 
not only the choice of subjects included in a law faculty curriculum, 
but also the choice of topics within each subject, and the choice of 
materials for study. For example, the materials for a course on the law 
of contracts typically do not include contracts, nor do they include 
much about the action for debt, which is the court remedy most 
commonly used for breach of contract. The typical contracts course 
1. Institutes of Justinian, English translation nb J. B. Moyle, Oxford, 1913, p. p. 
2. Ibid. 
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has consisted, almost exclusively, of a study of appellate decisions in 
actions for damages. Similarly constitutional law has often consisted 
almost exclusively of federalism, while courses on administrative law 
have often contained little except judicial review. This structure was 
reinforced as the "case method" became the conventional wisdom of 
legal education so that judgments in litigated cases were revered as 
having a pedagogical value superior to any other kind of material. 
Thus the preponderance of private law may well have resulted 
primarily from the abundance of literature that has sprung from Utes 
inter partes ; and in shaping the curriculum around that literature we 
may simply have followed a natural propensity to do things the easiest 
way. 
The second factor relates to the legal profession and the choice of 
forum. Courts of general jurisdiction have advantages for lawyers 
compared with other tribunals. The courtroom is the lawyer's own 
arena. It is here that the lawyer can play his Patrician role, exchanging 
with the judge in a formal manner the awesome jargon of his 
profession. It is here too that a range of issues and problems are 
processed through an intricate procedural machine, the mastery of 
which is the lawyer's demonstration to his client of the need for his 
services. 
Proceedings in specialized boards or commissions are different. 
Unless the lawyer deals with the particular tribunal regularly, he may 
be on unfamiliar ground. Not only might the client be more familiar 
than the lawyer with the subject matter of the dispute, and with the 
specialized branch of law, but he may also be more familiar with the 
procedures of the tribunal. Even if the lawyer is clearly able to present 
the case better than could his client, he might still run the risk of 
appearing inept compared with a lay advocate acting for another 
party. Other features of the process, such as the tribunal being self-
motivating, or discussing policy more overtly than is usual in the 
courts, can demand of the lawyer a kind of presentation different from 
that to which he is accustomed, and sometimes one that can be beyond 
his ability. 
The legal profession has an interest in reducing as many issues 
and disputes as possible to a common forum and a common 
procedure, and this interest is threatened by the proliferation of 
administrative tribunals. 
... it requires no great effort of the mind or will to enable a lawyer or a 
judge to persuade himself that a development which removes disputes 
from the courts, which will provide a mode of adjudication wherein the 
practising lawyer has so far had but little part, in which a rival technique 
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and a new jurisdiction will outstrip the waning popularity of the 
established courts, is a Machiavellian tendency which the public good 
requires to be stamped out like an evil pest.1 
The argument here presented does not deny the value of courts, 
nor is it intended as a judgment on the merits of other tribunals. The 
point being made is that regardless of the merits and regardless of the 
relative value of various tribunals to other sections of the community, 
lawyers have an interest in elevating courts of general jurisdiction and 
disparaging other tribunals ; and this interest may account for some 
aversion in the legal profession to many areas of public law. 
A third factor may be the limitations on human capacity to 
recognize and respond to the need for precautionary measures. A 
tragedy or misfortune that has already occurred has a victim — an 
identifiable person who may have the money and personal incentive to 
pay for professional help, or on whose behalf the urgent assistance of 
government might be sought. But a tragedy or misfortune that has not 
yet occurred may have no victim yet identified, and hence precautio-
nary measures may be unsupported either by private fees or political 
pressure. Whether or not this is the explanation, there appears to be 
something in human nature, or in human organization, that results in 
greater rewards and incentives for those who respond to alleviate 
affliction than for those who take precautions to prevent its occur-
rence. Thus in faculties of medicine the emphasis is on curative rather 
than preventive medicine. Similarly in faculties of law the emphasis is 
on dispute resolution rather than the orderly administration of public 
affairs. 
The remainder of this paper is concerned with the subsequent 
significance of the preponderance of private law in legal education. 
Conceptual and Procedural Limitations of Private Law 
Concepts and procedures usually regarded as fundamental in the 
common law evolved out of litigation. In many areas of public law, 
however, they are often inapplicable or of more limited use. Examples 
include the distinction between law and fact, the distinction between 
evidence and argument, the distinction between parties and non-
parties, and the single-event trial. The role of the adjudicating tribunal 
can also be different. In private law, the role of the court, geared to the 
lis inter partes, is generally limited to adjudication by a way of 
3. W. A. ROBSON, Justice and Administrative eaw,y*tA., 1951,p. 422. 
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response to the presentation made by the parties. By contrast, the role 
of an administrative tribunal commonly includes investigation and 
other self-initiated measures as a prelude to decision. 
Through the concentration in legal education on the concepts and 
procedures of the lis inter partes, lawyers have usually been trained in 
only one system in depth, though with a mention of others. Conse-
quently the profession has not developed the procedural flexibility to 
function willingly and effectively in different arenas. 
Another consequence is that in many areas of law, the legal 
profession has avoided the role of adjudication, leaving it to others 
who may not have the disciplinary background for deciding the issues 
of law and policy involved. Examples of this can be found in relation 
to medical services and hospital facilities. Decisions must be made 
frequently about the termination of life, the survival of seriously 
deformed babies, blood transfusions, organ transplants, and the 
allocation of limited resources to patients with competing needs. 
These decisions involve questions of law and policy relating to vital 
issues of life and death itself. Yet we leave the decisions to the medical 
profession as if they involved purely medical questions. Thereby the 
criteria by which the decisions are made are obscured from public view 
and insulated from review through the democratic process. Having 
such decisions, or some of them, made by lawyers would at least 
distinguish medicine from policy, and it would also get the criteria of 
decision into the open. 
If a public or legislative debate ever occurred on whether all or 
any of these questions should be decided by doctors, lawyers, or 
others, it could well be that a consensus would emerge in favour of all 
such decisions being made by doctors. The point of the argument, 
however, is not to demonstrate that such decisions ought to be made 
by lawyers or by others. Rather the point is that the legal profession 
has failed to offer an alternative. Hence such questions have come to 
be decided by the medical profession not because of any public or 
legislative choice, but by default. By concentrating so heavily on the lis 
inter partes, the legal profession has not developed the conceptual or 
institutional framework that would make the decision of such 
questions within the legal system a realistic possibility. 
Legislators have not been offered the option of using, if they so 
wish, the legal process for a wide range of decisions ; and this has 
occurred for no better reason than that the decisions do not involve a 
lis inter partes. 
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The Visibility of Law 
It is surely a basic principle of any civilized system of law, 
particularly in an urban democracy, that the laws by which people are 
governed must be published for all to read. Only to a limited extent, 
however, is this principle followed in our public law. 
However paradoxical it may seem, most of our private law is 
available to the public, or at least to the legal profession, while the 
bulk of our public law is secret. 
Although the publication of law has been debated episodically 
through the centuries, a comprehensive system for publication has 
never been evolved. In private law, the judgments rendered in 
litigation have provided a record of principles and rules. The synthesis 
of these in digests and textbooks has created the working manuals of 
private law. 
In public law, there is nothing comparable. There are the statutes, 
but generally they provide only the skeletal framework. In some areas, 
such as labour law, there are also recorded decisions and textbooks. 
But in many areas, the working law of the system is contained in secret 
directives or secret manuals. In unemployment insurance, for exam-
ple, the Commission issues, in addition to the regulations, office 
directive manuals of practice and principles to be applied in the 
adjudication of claims. These manuals are so secret that copies will 
not even be supplied to provincial officials working in related areas. 
Similarly in most provinces, workers compensation claims are 
adjudicated by reference to rules contained in secret manuals or secret 
directives. Another example is in the municipal taxation of property. 
The criteria for evaluation and the worksheet used by the assessor are 
commonly treated as secret documents, and a request by the tax-payer 
for copies is refused. 
The same is true with regard to much of the law generated by 
major corporations. For example, the effective rules relating to repairs 
under automobile warranties are contained in secret communications 
from automobile manufacturers to dealers. 
The problem of secret law has been considered in recent years, at 
least at the federal level. The Special Committee on Statutory 
Instruments recommended: 
... that all departmental directives and guidelines as to the exercise of 
discretion under a statute or regulation where the public is directly 
affected by such discretion should be published and also subjected to 
parliamentary scrutiny.4 
4. Special Commiitee on Statutory Instruments, Third Report, Canana, 1968-1969, p. 292 
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But legislation requiring the publication of statutory instruments 
is not likely to solve the problem. Such legislation does not extend to 
law which is not generated under statutory powers. Also in most 
jurisdictions, the definition of the regulations required to be published 
is sufficiently narrow that officials have little difficulty in promulgating 
rules in a documentary form that will lie outside the definition. Most 
important of all, even when the rules are of a type required to be 
published there is usually no effective sanction for non-compliance. 
The only sanction for non-publication is that the rules may not be 
enforceable in the courts as regulations. Thus publication is only 
required as a practical matter if it is necessary to enforce compliance 
by the public at large, or at least by some people outside the system. 
As long as the body of law can be implemented entirely by people 
within the system, the rules can be and commonly are contained in 
secret manuals or directives. 
The objections to secret law are, of course, profound. First, it can 
be difficult for the people interested in a pending decision to submit 
evidence or argument if they cannot check what is relevant because the 
applicable criteria are not published. Secondly, any right of appeal 
that might be provided can be difficult to use if people cannot check 
whether established criteria have been followed. Thirdly, reform 
through the democratic process is impeded if those who might 
advocate or discuss reform are not allowed to inform themselves of 
what is and why. Fourthly, if rules of a quasi-legislative nature are not 
published, any violation of statute law is concealed, and there is no 
check through publicity on the legality of the rules. Fifthly, the 
absence of published criteria can facilitate arbitrariness, or the 
infiltration of improper criteria. Sixthly, the failure to publish 
manuals and directives is often co-extensive with a failure to give 
reasons for decisions. Together, these failures negate the value of 
publicity for quality control in public appointments. The absence of 
any evidence that those responsible for decisions are able to write can 
also mark the absence of any assurance that they are able to think. 
Published criteria and reasons for decisions written by the 
tribunal members, or the other public officials responsible for the 
decisions, are essential to ensure the appointment of people who have 
the ability to think, to analyze, and to decide in a rational manner. 
Remedies 
The discussion under this heading relates to the non-fulfilment of 
legal obligations, or the lack of adequate performance, by public 
officials or tribunals. 
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Consider the example of a provincial statute relating to the 
construction and use of public buildings, the purpose being to prevent 
danger to the public from fire. A fire precautions officer is appointed in 
each city to enforce the regulations made under the Act. 
In city A, there is an average of one complaint a month to the city 
or provincial government about X,. the fire precautions officer. The 
complaints are that he is "too demanding", "unreasonable", "against 
construction", or "trying to drive us out of business". There are never 
any complaints about Y, who is the fire precautions officer in city B. 
Consider : 
1. Which of those two officials is most likely to be functioning 
efficiently in achieving the objectives of the legislation ? 
2. Which of those two officials is most likely to be supported in his 
role by the legal structure? 
If X is going too far, there are legal and political remedies that might 
be invoked by an aggrieved property owner to restrain any abuse of 
power. But if Y is suffering from inertia, or maintaining popularity by 
adapting his decisions to the wishes of property owners, there are 
generally no legal or political remedies likely to be invoked by the 
potential victims of fire (though it might be different after a fire has 
occurred). This example will be referred to in connection with some of 
the points that follow. 
As Maitland explained,5 the substantive rules of the common law 
emerged out of a system of remedies and procedures. Hence in private 
law there is a system of analytical procedures for achieving remedial 
judgments. Only to a more limited extent is this true in public law. 
In several areas, there are strong remedies available to public 
officials to enforce the performance of obligations by citizens. But a 
comprehensive system of public law remedies to enforce the perfor-
mance of obligations by public officials, whether elected or appointed, 
has never been developed. Insofar as remedial procedures are 
available against public officials they have tended to be not public law 
remedies designed for the achievement of public policies, but the 
intrusion of private law concepts designed for the protection of private 
rights. This can be illustrated under the sub-headings that follow. 
Judicial Review 
Here the performance of a public official or administrative 
tribunal is challenged and tested not by reference to the achievement 
5. F. W. MAITLAND, The Forms so Actton ax Common naw, Cambridgd U.U., 19194 
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of the objectives for which the office or tribunal was created, but by 
reference to jurisdictional limitations, and by reference to the extent of 
compliance with procedural concepts evolved in the context of the lis 
inter partes. Thus through judicial review of administrative action, we 
have institutionalized the intrusion of private law concepts into public 
administration. There is no corresponding system of administrative 
review of judicial action. 
Another limitation on the value of judicial review is that the 
courts lack the executive authority to make their decisions effective. 
Thus if the area is one in which the representation of parties by 
lawyers is not normal, the official or tribunal can follow the court 
order in the particular case in which judicial review has been sought, 
but still continue in the same old way on every other matter. 
Certiorari and Prohibition are essentially negative restraints on 
official action. They may have some value as safeguards against the 
infringement of private rights by any abuse of public power. But they 
do nothing to compel the proper exercise of power by public officials 
for the achievement of public policies. 
Mandamus is a positive remedy designed to bring about the 
performance of a public function rather than to restrain excess. But it 
tQO has much the character of a private law remedy. Before 
mandamus is issued, there must be an applicant, and he must be 
someone with an interest in the performance of the official duties 
which is greater than the interest of the public at large.6 
There is a similar problem with declaratory relief. The courts 
have recently broadened the range of circumstances in which a citizen 
can question the validity of a statute. Thus a citizen with no status 
except as a federal taxpayer may, at the discretion of the court, have 
status to impugn the validity of a federal statute.7 But again, it is a 
negative check on the functioning of government. It is doubtful 
whether the court would allow an action against the refusal of a 
government to legislate on the ground that it has no legislative 
jurisdiction, and even more doubtful whether anyone would ever 
attempt such an action. 
Returning to the example of the fire precautions officer mentio-
ned above, judicial review might have some use in restraining any 
excess of authority by X. But it has no potential for inducing 
performance by Y. 
6. S. A. DE SMITH, Judicial Review of'Administrative Action,^ ed., e968, pp. 571-571-
7. Thorson v. Attorney-General of Canana, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 1381 
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Ombudsman 
While the institution of an ombudsman can no doubt be helpful to 
some individuals, it does not show much potential as a quality control 
device in the performance of public officials or public bodies. Indeed, 
it can be more of a palliative than a public law remedy. 
First, the jurisdiction of an ombudsman, at least in common law 
countries, has generally focussed on the performance of public officials 
who exercise only slight to moderate degrees of power. The most 
powerful people in governing roles, such as ministers of the crown, the 
chief executives of major corporations, the proprietors of the 
communications media, and the judiciary, are not usually made 
subject to the surveillance of an ombudsman. 
Secondly, the role of an ombudsman is designed to be or tends to 
become that of an official who processes complaints against other 
public officials or public bodies. That may be politically expedient, and 
it may also be useful. But it is not what is needed to monitor the 
performance of public officials in the achievement of public policy 
objectives. Thus an ombudsman can be seen not as a remedial 
institution designed in a public law context, but rather as another 
example of the intrusion into public administration of a private law 
concept the need for a grievor. 
Consider again the example of the fire precautions officials 
mentioned above. If anyone is complaining to an ombudsman, it is 
likely to be a property owner seeking to induce official X to relax his 
enforcement. The potential victims of fire are unlikely to produce a 
grievor, and hence an ombudsman is unlikely to discover any laxity of 
official Y. 
Another example might be seen in the administration of welfare 
benefits. A welfare department in a particular jurisduction may have 
established a system of appeals to deal with complaints, or there may 
be a statutory system of appeals. To keep his case-load within 
manageable limits, an ombudsman may well insist that he is unavaila-
ble to welfare applicants until the appeal procedures have been 
exhausted. But consider where, among the total universe of welfare 
applicants, the greatest incidence of injustice is most likely to be 
found. Would it be among those, perhaps the more aggressive 
personalities, who have been through the appeal system, had their 
grievances found unjustified, and now wish to appeal beyond? Or 
would it be among those, perhaps more timorous souls, who have 
accepted an adverse decision made at first instance, perhaps because 
they accept without question any decision of anyone in authority? 
Even people who are normally self-confident or demanding can 
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become quiescent when afflicted by disability, unemployment, marital 
desertion, or other problems of welfare applicants. If an ombudsman 
is needed in this area it is surely for spot checking at his own initiative 
a sample of cases where no complaint has been made, and thereby 
reviewing the system, rather than for processing the remaining 
complaints of those who have already appealed. It is also by 
proceeding in this way that an ombudsman is most likely to spot any 
maladministration resulting in over-payment as well as any resulting 
in under-payment. 
The institution of an ombudsman is surely a public law remedy 
only to the extent that he acts upon his own initiative, using cases 
selected by random or special formula as a vehicle for systems reviews. 
If an ombudsman acts only in response to complaints, and particularly 
if he acts only in response to the complaints of those who have already 
appealed elsewhere, the institution is then analogous to a private law 
remedy ; another example of the old common law maxim — the 
squeaky wheel gets the grease. 
Other Remedies 
Other legal remedies are of course sometimes available against 
public officials or public bodies, particularly tort claims and criminal 
prosecutions. But again they are unlikely to be invoked except in 
situations of excess or abuse. They are not broad and useful remedies 
against inertia or under-achievement. Occasionally a tort claim is 
brought. against a public official for negligence. But the claim is 
normally to recoup a private loss after the harm has been done. The 
action for negligence is not a broad remedy for compelling the 
performance of public duties aimed at public policy objectives. 
Other Pressures 
The intrusion of private law concepts into the remedies affecting 
public administration might be seen as achieving a desirable equili-
brium if it operated to counterbalance pressures that public officials 
are otherwise under. But that does not appear to be the case. It may be 
useful here to itemize some of the other pressures. 
One is the financial controls. It is normal in government 
operations to have a system of expenditure approvals with a hierarchi-
cal structure in which the level of the decision depends on the amount. 
Thus proposals by junior officials to undertake activities that involve 
unusual expenditure must go up the line for approval. But a lapse into 
inertia requires no such scrutiny. 
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The external audit probably operates in much the same way. The 
inspection by an auditor-general may well involve a scrutiny of 
whether the accounts are in order, expenditures approved, assets 
controls operating, and a proper system of tendering for contracts is 
being followed. But it is unlikely to include any appraisal of how far 
the department or agency is achieving its policy objectives. Here 
again, the scrutiny focuses on routines to check for excess or abuse, 
but not to check for under-achievement. 
If there is lobbying pressure, this too may be more likely to 
coincide with private law remedies than to counterbalance them. To 
revert to the example of the fire precautions officers mentioned above, 
lobbying pressure is more likely against official X than against official 
Y. Social sanctions would tend to operate in the same direction, for it 
is surely more likely that X would be unpopular among some of the 
citizens of A than that Y would be unpopular among any of the 
citizens of B. 
The pension plan can be another influence. Government pension 
plans familiar to me make no provision for vesting, so that an 
employee who leaves the government under the age of 45 or with less 
than 10 years service receives no benefit at all from any employer's 
contribution. For those who remain until retirement age, the pension 
is calculated by reference to salary during the last five years. These 
provisions are a heavy penalty against short service; and for long-
service employees they can put a premium on being inoffensive, even 
though that may coincide with being unproductive. 
With regard to regulated industries, pressures against achieve-
ment can also result from peer-group affiliations between those who 
are supposed to be regulating and those who are supposed to be 
regulated. 
It may be helpful to illustrate the relationship of private law 
remedies to other pressures by a specific example. Consider the 
pressures operating on a worker's compensation board in relation to 
claims. Employers and employers' organizations may be pressing for a 
reduction of claims and administrative costs. Workers and unions may 
be pressing for greater claims payments and better services. Because 
of the principle of collective liability, the employers' lobbying is most 
likely to relate to the aggregate, while the attention of workers and 
unions is more likely to focus on a small minority of individual claims. 
If any board lacks the integrity, understainding or ministerial support 
to resist the lobbying, it can accommodate both pressures by adopting 
different standards for different levels of adjudication. At first 
instance, decisions can be based on the face of the injury reports and 
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reached in a peremptory way, following the general principle that if a 
claim looks at all doubtful, reject it and see if the worker complains. 
Not only will this minimize the total payment cost of claims but it will 
also minimize the administrative costs. For those workers who 
complain, a proper inquiry can be commenced and a proper adjudica-
tion can be made in the appeal system. The impropriety of this should 
be obvious ; so too should its adverse affect on medical treatment, on 
the motivation and confidence of the worker, and on his rehabilitation. 
Proposals sometimes emerge from among the legal profession 
that would aggravate rather than alleviate the problem. One is that 
after a final decision on appeal within the board, a further review of 
claims decisions should be possible outside the board, either by 
appeals to courts or by an ombudsman. Another proposal sometimes 
heard is for legal aid in the appeal process. But to the extent that any 
board is succumbing to the pressures described above, these proposals 
would tend to give an appearance of legitimacy to the system, and to 
consolidate rather than eliminate the problem. Remedies to counte-
ract pressures of this kind are not going to be found if the private law 
procedures of the lis inter partes are perceived as the source of 
inspiration. The need for outside surveillance to maintain the quality 
of decision-making in worker's compensation is not for a further level 
of appeal, but for automatic inspection to monitor the quality of 
decisions made at first instance.8 
Conclusions 
The approach of the legal profession to public administration has 
been burdened by a private law background, particularly a private law 
procedural background. One result is that the profession has not 
shown the procedural flexibility to develop remedies to assure the 
performance of public officials in the achievement of public policy 
objectives. By focussing on abuse and excess, we have tended to avoid 
the proper exercise of public power. In so doing we have developed 
remedies that tend to reinforce rather than counterbalance the 
pressures that public officials are otherwise under. These remedies and 
pressures constitute a system of checks and safeguards against almost 
everything — except under-achievement. 
8. In British Columbia, a step in this direction was taken in 1974 by establishing outside 
boards of review as the first level of appeal, with the Commissioners of the W.C.B. as the 
final level. 
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The Preparation of Social Legislation 
The preparation or amendment of modern social legislation has 
requirements very different from the preparation of statutes amending 
the common law. The need has sometimes been met, for example, by 
establishing a special group to prepare a particular statute. But no 
thorough and continuing machinery has been established for the 
preparation of social legislation. Hence it is still normal to find 
substantive rules being enacted without implementation machinery or 
useable sanctions.9 
It may be helpful to itemize what is needed in the preparation of 
regulatory or service legislation, and then to compare this with what 
legislative counsel normally provide. The preparation of such legisla-
tion may require that at least the following be considered, though not 
necessarily mentioned in the statute. 
1. Identification of the objectives ; 
2. The choices of methods — research, information, persuasion, 
direction ; 
3. The qualifications, selection, training and terms of appointment 
of key personnel ; 
4. The regulatory requirements, or the machinery for establishing 
the requirements; 
5. Administrative structure, procedures, sanctions, and adjudica-
tion; 
6. Detection — how will non-compliance come to the attention of 
someone with an interest or duty to invoke the sanctions?; 
7. The resources required for implementation, and whether the 
government is willing to allocate the resources, including a review 
of monetary and non-monetary costs ; 
8. Identification of the political costs of implementation, and 
whether the government is willing to pay the political costs ; 
9. What are the most powerful interests opposed to the legislation, 
what form is the pressure from those interests likely to take after 
enactment, and what is required to counteract the pressure? 
It is not suggested that legislative counsel should always take the 
initiative in raising the relevant questions, or in having them resolved. 
But if he does not consider them himself he ought surely to itemize 
questions of this kind, and try to ensure than they have been 
considered elsewhere; and he should certainly have the dexterity to 
9. E.G. Consumer Protection nct, S.B.B.C 1967, Ch. h.1 Para III 
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accommodate the answers in his drafting. Otherwise he can be 
producing useless and wasteful legislation. 
The role of legislative counsel is, however, usually perceived as 
much more limited and technical. He will usually design the structure 
of a statute, perhaps aiming at consistency with other Acts. He will 
consider the logical sequence of the material, its arrangement into 
sections, and other points of organization and drafting technique. He 
may translate his instructions into language that has been well defined, 
either in other statutes or in litigation.10 
This limited perception of the role of legislative counsel is 
reflected in government salary structures. The preparation of legisla-
tion ought surely to require the highest standard of legal ability. If it 
includes considering or checking on questions of the kind listed above, 
it is certainly more demanding than adjudication. Yet the salaries of 
legislative counsel are generally below those of the judiciary. 
If the expertise to cope with questions of the kind listed above is 
not provided elsewhere, any failure of legislative counsel to provide it 
can result in legislation that is useless, misleading to the public, and a 
waste a resources. If the expertise is available elsewhere, however, this 
can result in conflict between legislative counsel and the deputy 
minister, board chairman, or other official responsible for preparing 
the legislation. The latter will probably want to use the language of the 
ordinary public and the concepts of the department, service, industry 
or tribunal concerned. The former may prefer to use the language of 
the courts, however unlikely it is that the Act will be interpreted in that 
forum, and however much this may make it unreadable to those who 
are supposed to comply with it." Here again, the dominance of the lis 
inter partes in legal education can be seen as creating a perception of 
the lawyer's role that tends to undermine rather than enhance the 
achievements of public administration. 
If such a conflict occurs between legislative counsel and those 
responsible for the preparation of social legislation, it can be one of 
the influences in favour of skeleton legislation, leaving as much as 
possible to be determined by regulation. 
The design of the regulation-making power may also reflect a 
desire to avoid the negative influence of private law on legislative 
10. For a perception of the role of legislative counsel, see E.G.: E. A. DRIEDCER. The 
Composition of Legislation, Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1967. 
11. In one example that came to my attention, legislative counsel objected most persistently to 
the use of the word "people" on the ground that this word had not been judicially defined. 
(Everyone else seemed to know what it meant.) Legislative counsel preferred "persons 
other than a corporation". 
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drafting. The authority to promulgate regulations under a statute is 
usually conferred upon either: 
A. The Governor or Lieutenant-Governor in Council ; 
or 
B. A minister, board or commission. 
Of course the choice between A or B might reflect a judgment on the 
desirability of having the regulations passed by the cabinet. But in at 
least some jurisdictions, there is a government rule that regulations 
must be prepared or approved in the Attorney-General's office if they 
are to be promulgated by order-in-council. This is not required for 
other regulations. Hence the choice of B rather than A may reflect a 
desire to avoid the Attorney-General's office rather than a judgment 
on the merits of promulgation by the cabinet. It may reflect a concern 
on the part of the responsible minister or official that regulations in an 
area of public law should not be nullified or mutilated by translation 
into the vocabulary and concepts of private law. 
It could be interesting to illustrate the influence of private law in 
the preparation of social legislation. But there is an obvious difficulty 
in citing examples of weaknesses in legislation that are clearly and 
only attributable to the influence of private law. Influences are harder 
to identify than inputs, and the preparation of any social legislation 
involves the concurrent operation of such a variety of influences, many 
of them obscure, that it is hardly possible to ascribe consequences to 
one of them. It is not difficult, however, to find examples of 
weaknesses in social legislation that are explicable as the result of an 
intrusion of private law thinking, though other explanations are also 
credible. 
One such example is the development of consumer protection 
bureaux in the U.S. and Canada during the last 20 years, following the 
New York model. These are the bureaux that recover money for 
aggrieved consumers and issue or obtain prohibitions against preda-
tory practices in marketing. But they do not operate or concentrate on 
any program of detection and penal sanctions that might have 
déterrant value to prevent fraudulent or predatory practices from 
arising in the first place. It is at least arguable that the legislation 
establishing these bureaux is more likely to promote than to prevent 
predatory practices in marketing. 
Another example is in the licensing provisions of the Consumer 
Protection Act 2 of Ontario. The procedural framework is modelled 
12. R.S.O. 1970, Ch. 82. 
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on the litigation process rather than being designed to meet the policy 
objectives of the Act. 
The Environmental Contaminants Act3 of Canada contains 
another example. The schedule to the Act is intended to identify 
harmful contaminants the emission of which is prohibited or restric-
ted. There are eleborate procedures and safeguards in the Act to 
protect private interests against the unwarranted inclusion of a 
contaminant in the schedule. But there are no corresponding procedu-
res or safeguards to protect the public interest against the unwarranted 
omission or deletion of a contaminant. 
Administration and Adjudication 
Even after its enactment, social legislation can still oe retarded by 
the intrusion of private law concepts. In workers' compensation, for 
example, the essence of the plan was to abandon liability for 
negligence in favour of a system of compensation for employment 
injuries regardless of fault. Yet time and again lawyers, steeped in the 
law of tort, have decided or advised that a claim be denied for reasons 
which, when analyzed, amount to nothing more than that the worker 
was at fault.14 
The same influence can be seen in the promulgation of regula-
tions. For example, the Accident Prevention Regulations of the 
Worker's Compensation Board (B.C.) provided for an appeal to the 
Commissioners against any compliance order, or the imposition of a 
penalty.15 But there was no provision for any appeal against a failure 
or refusal to issue an order or to impose a penalty.16 
In the administrative procedures of the same Board, the influence 
of private law, or of other pressures on administrators to prefer ' 
private interests over public policies, could be seen again. Where an 
accident prevention officer discovered serious violations of the regula-
tions, he was required to explain and justify any recommendation that 
a sanction be invoked. But he was not (prior to 1974) required to 
explain or justify the absence of such a recommendation. Here in the 
administration of a statute, enacted for the safety of workers, a 
procedural safeguard was created for the protection of private 
13. S.C. 1974-1975, Ch. 72. 
14. For a discussion of this, see Decision No. .08, (1975) 2 Workers' Compensation Reporter 
44 (B.C.). 
15. Reg. 4.10 as revised in 1972. 
16. Proposals drawn up in 1975 for revision of the regulattons provided for this to be changed. 
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interests, while no comparable procedural safeguard was created for 
achieving the public policy objectives of the Act, even though they 
involved the protection of human life. 
Similar examples of the unwarranted intrusion of private law 
concepts and values can be found in the court system. When the 
Government of British Columbia took over the B.C. Electric Co., the 
legislation determined the rate of compensation to be paid to the B.C. 
Power Corporation (the shareholder), and it also provided that this 
should not be open to question in any court.17 The constitutional 
validity of the legislation was challenged as an encroachment on 
federal legislative jurisdiction. The court might have decided that the 
takeover legislation was or was not a valid exercise of provincial 
power. But on no view of the constitutional position could the value of 
the shares be relevant. The trial judge conceded that the value of the 
shares was not relevant.18 Nevertheless he devoted many days of 
evidence and many pages of reasons to arrive at a conclusion on value. 
It is hard to find any credible explanation except to create a political 
pressure on the government to pay more than the statute provided. 
Here again, dedication to the protection of private property interests 
appears to have prevailed over fidelity to statute law. 
Institutional Limitations 
Some regulatory legislation, for example wage and price controls, 
has a history almost as old as the common law. Courts of summary 
jurisdiction had administrative and regulatory roles relating to those 
controls as well as, for example, the licensing of taverns and the repair 
of highways. Some functions of an administrative nature were also 
performed in the superior courts, including the superior courts of 
specialized jurisdiction, such as admiralty and probate. But just as 
modern social legislation was being introduced on a broad scale in the 
late 19th century, so during the same period, the superior courts of 
specialized jurisdiction were being merged into a court, of general 
jurisdiction. In this new style of high court, the institutional, 
conceptual and procedural framework was one that had evolved 
primarily out of criminal prosecutions and private litigation ; and it 
was the handling of these matters that appears to have shaped the 
public perception of what a court is or should be. The court lacked the 
17. Power Development Act, ,961, 2'",sess.s Ch. 4; Power Development Act 1961 Amendment 
Act, 1962, Ch. 50. 
18. B.C. Power Corp. v. A.C. of British Columbia et al, (1963) 44 W.W.R. 65, .91, 
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institutional framework, the staff, and the procedural flexibility to 
cope with regulatory and service legislation. In one statute after 
another, the court was excluded from any adjudicative role and a new 
administrative tribunal was created. 
In recent years there appears to have been some revival of interest 
in the potential value, at least in in some areas, of superior courts of 
specialized jurisdiction. In Canada, the old exchequer court has been 
reorganized into the new Federal Court, and in England the Restric-
tive Trade Practices Court was created. 
Unless there is a constitutional change, however, the potential for 
further development in this area may be limited to matters within 
federal legislative jurisdiction ; for it is doubtful whether the provinces 
have authority to appoint a judiciary in a superior court of specialized 
jurisdiction.19 Thus when a provincial government enacts a regulatory 
or service statute that will generate issues requiring adjudication, it 
usually elects between adjudication in the ordinary courts or creating 
an administrative tribunal. Establishing an inferior court of speciali-
zed jurisdiction would be a constitutional possibility, but it is not 
usually a viable alternative for other reasons. 
What is being suggested here is that this limitation is unfortunate, 
unnecessary, and a possible handicap in the development of public 
law. It is not the purpose here to analyze exactly how and when a 
superior court of specialized jurisdiction would be preferable to an 
administrative tribunal, or to the ordinary courts. What is being 
suggested is that the appointment of a judiciary to a superior court of 
specialized jurisdiction ought to be one of the permissible options from 
which a province can make its institutional choices. 
The Constitutional Danger 
In recent years, the curricula of law faculties have shown a 
stronger offering in constitutional law. This is surely a healthy trend, 
but one that needs to go further if we are to avert the constitutional 
danger that can result from a preponderance of private law in legal 
education. 
Lawyers occupy a substantial proportion of the political and 
administrative positions in national and provincial leadership, and it is 
to them that many others look for example or turn for advice on 
matters of constitutional law and propriety. Legal education ought 
19. B.N.A. Act, Section 96. 
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surely to include, as priority matters, the structure and workings of 
government, legislative supremacy, the conduct of elections, legisla-
tive and executive processes, conduct in public office, proper and 
improper forms of lobbying, and other matters of constitutional 
propriety. 
Apart from the accessibility of material, there are of course other 
reasons why constitutional law in this country came to focus on 
federalism. During the period in which Canadian legal traditions were 
developing, it may well have been perceived as of paramount 
importance to unite under a common government communities of 
diverse origins, separated by great distances, and with established 
forms of local and regional government. It is understandable that 
federalism became the central and almost exclusive topic in constitu-
tional law : but it would be indefensible if it remained so. That law 
graduates should have a solid foundation in the principles of its 
constitution is surely essential to the future well-being of any society. 
Earlier this year, allegations of a constitutional impropriety were 
made in relation to what the press described as "the judges affair1'. But 
the misconduct alleged was surely pale in comparison with the 
constitutional improprieties that are more frequent in government. 
The independence of the judiciary from executive direction or other 
pressures is vital ; but it is also well protected. The independence of 
administrative tribunals is infinitely more vulnerable. 
There is no universal principle governing the relationship between 
an administrative tribunal and the executive branch of government. 
The obvious distinction, however, between a government department 
and an administrative tribunal is that a minister has an overall 
responsibility for the former, but not for the latter. The extent to 
which a particular tribunal should reach its conclusions independently 
and the extent to which it should take ministerial direction are 
determined by the terms of the Act under which each tribunal is 
created. There is, however, a general constitutional principle that the 
terms of the Act must be observed by all concerned. This is simply an 
aspect of legislative supremacy. It is this principle that is unprotected. 
With regard to matters that the governing statute requires a tribunal 
to decide for itself, it is not uncommon for ministerial direction to be 
demanded, sought or given without any apparent consciousness 
among the' people concerned, including members of the legal profes-
sion, of any impropriety.20 
20. During my term as chairman of an administrative tribunal, I was frequently asked by 
lawyers what the relationship was between the Board and the Government, and in 
particular to what extent the Board took ministerial direction. I replied that we simply 
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The disregard of statute law is, moreover, a problem much 
broader than the role of ministers in relation to administrative 
tribunals. It extends also to cabinet and departmental decisions. 
During the 17th century struggle between king and parliament, a 
key issue was the royal assertion of a right to suspend and dispense 
with laws. Following the Civil War and the subsequent abdication of 
James II, the matter was settled, or thought to have been settled, by 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Bill of Rights:21 
1. That the pretended Power of suspending Laws, or the Execution of 
Laws, by regal Authority, without Consent of Parliament, is illegal. 
2. That the pretended Power of dispensing with Laws, or the Execution of 
Laws, by regal Authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of 
late, is illegal. 
In recent years, however, the executive claim of a right to suspend 
or dispense with statute law has been resurrected. Moreover it would 
be a wise precaution, and not unreasonable, to assume that the 
examples that have come to public attention may be only the tip of the 
iceberg. There appears to be no systematic screening of departmental 
or ministerial instructions to assure their compliance with statute 
law ;22 nor does it appear to be a normal part of the induction or 
training of public servants to explain that statute law takes precedence 
oyer departmental or ministerial instructions. Indeed, this does not 
even appear to be part of the induction process for ministers of the 
crown. 
Further examples of the problem appeared recently with regard 
to inflation. When the federal government announced an "anti-
inflation policy" and sought provincial co-operation, there appeared 
to emerge an assumption that the statute law of a province could be 
dispensed with by executive action in pursuit of the new "policy". 
Examples appeared of ministers of the crown making decisions, 
followed the terms of the Act. Where the Act provided for a matter to be determined by the 
Board it was decided by the Board without guidance being sought from or given by the 
minister. Where the Act provided for a matter to be determined by order-in-council, that 
was regarded as a proper matter for discussion with the minister. The reply always met with 
surprise, and often with a comment that it differed from the experience of the enquirer in 
regard to another tribunal or another time or place. That the Board was not subjected to 
ministerial interventions was, however, not for the want of trying by various people. It was 
not unusual for someone to solicit the minister to give direction to the Board on a matter 
that was clearly within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board to determine, and the people 
so trying included lawyers acting for clients. 
21. 1 W. and M.. 2nd sess., Ch. 11, ( 1689) 3 Statutes at Large, 275,276. 
22. This of course adds to the gravity of the secret law problem explained above. 
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issuing instructions, or urging others to make decisions, in violation of 
statute law." 
One might expect that in any parliamentary democracy this 
revival by ministers of the old Stuart claim to be above the law would 
result in an outcry from the press. But that did not occur. On the 
contrary, editorials appeared that condoned and even applauded 
ministerial actions that were incompatible with the constitutional 
principle of the supremacy of the legislature.24 
One might also expect that senior public servants would decline 
to accept ministerial decisions that are a violation of statute law. But if 
one of them does, the probabilities that he will be dismissed or resign 
may well be greater than the probabilities that this will occur to the 
minister." 
It is, of course, impossible to determine exactly the extent to 
which illegal or improper directions are issued in the executive 
branches of government. There is no screening process and no tally 
sheet. To achieve accuracy in a quantitative measurement of the 
practice is, however, less important than to identify the influences 
likely to promote its expansion or contraction. To whatever extent 
there exists in government a lack of fidelity to statute law, the study of 
constitutional law will only be a remedial influence to the extent that it 
focusses on matters, such as the parliamentary process and conduct in 
public office, that are not systematically covered in the literature of 
litigation. 
The Use of Private Law for the Pursuit 
of Public Policy Objectives 
This paper has focussed so far on the intrusion of private law in 
public administration. At least a passing mention should be made of a 
collateral matter — the potential of private law for the pursuit of 
public policy objectives independently of public administration. Much 
has been written on this elsewhere,26 and no exhaustive coverage will 
be attempted here. But it may be helpful to comment on two points. 
23. See, E.G. : "McGeer Asks Trustees to Roll Back Wage Pacts", Vancouver Sun, 2"* 
January, 1976, in relation to the Public Schools Act, R.S.B.C. 1960, Ch. 319, S. 142. 
24. E.G. : "Teachers : A Legal Smokescreen", Vancouver Province, 9 Jan. 1976. 
25. E.G. the resignation of Mr. F. A. McGregor as Combines Commissioner. See Parliamen-
tary Debates, Commons, 1949, Vol. II, pp. 1438, 1503-1506. 
26. See, E.G. : A.M. LINDEN, "Tort Law as Ombudsman", (1973) 51 C.B.R. 155. 
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Next after debt claims, the largest category of civil litigation is 
probably claims for damages for personal injuries. In this area, 
suggestions are sometimes heard that tort liability can play a useful 
role in the prevention of injuries. For reasons that have been explained 
elsewhere,27 the potential of tort liability in this respect is very limited. 
With regard to injuries that are the immediate consequences of 
their causes, the frequency of tort claims and the severity of the 
damages are not likely to be sufficient to have regulatory significance. 
In highway transport as well as in other areas of activity there is surely 
a public will that the levels of acceptable risk should be lower than the 
points at which they would settle if tort liability were the controlling 
influence. This does not deny that tort liability may have some value as 
a preventive influence in some circumstances. But it is not an 
alternative to a regulatory system that can provide for testing, 
inspections and sanctions without waiting for injuries to occur. 
In any event, many disabilities are not an immediate consequence 
of their causes. For example, when carcinogenic substances are 
introduced into the market, the work-place, or the atmosphere, it can 
be 20 years before they produce their disabling and lethal results. Tort 
liability has little preventive value in relation to these kinds of hazards. 
In areas where tort liability is alleged to have preventive value, it 
is usually argued that this is useful as an auxiliary influence for safety, 
not as a total alternative to regulatory legislation. 
There are, of course, many areas where reform or development in 
private law could be valuable for achieving public policy objectives. 
But the structures and procedures that have been adopted for reform 
in private law tend to screen out or minimize public policy objectives 
rather than give them any kind of priority. Routine reform and 
development occurs primarily in appellate adjudication. But the 
formal adherence of English and Canadian judges to the declaratory 
theory of the judicial role appears to have precluded the development 
in the appellate courts of these countries of the procedural flexibility 
appropriate for quasi-legislative functions. Revisions of rules or 
principles are made in response to arguments presented on behalf of 
parties having limited interests in limited issues. A far wider range of 
interests and issues can be affected by the revisions that result. 
A possible solution might be to counterbalance revision through 
appellate adjudication by having branches of private law reviewed 
episodically by a commission designed to consider the various private 
and public interests affected, and to recommend legislative reform. 
27. T. G. ISON, The Forensic Lottery, Staples Press, 1967, Ch. 5. 
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But this solution has not been adopted. The provincial law reform 
commissions actually established seem designed to reinforce rather 
than to solve the problem. 
The term "private law" tends to become synonymous with 
"lawyer's law". Whether consequently or coincidentally, law reform 
commissions have usually consisted exclusively of lawyers. Their 
primary orientation and source of input is the legal profession. This 
structure is designed to reflect the interests of clients for whom lawyers 
normally act rather than public interests that are more obscure, more 
remote in time, more dissipated, unorganized, or which for other 
reasons do not produce an inflow of legal work. 
An example of the problem can be seen in the absence of control 
over fraud and other predatory practices in marketing. It has been 
argued elsewhere28 that predatory practices in credit marketing can be 
controlled most effectively not by direct regulation, or by any other 
kink of "add-on" approach, but by abolishing a limited category of 
debt claims. Law reform commissions are, however, not designed to 
absorb that type of proposal. When reform takes place in the law 
relating to credit marketing and chattel securities, the primary 
interests recognized as requiring protection are those of the credit 
grantor, the manufacturer and the distributor — the major clients of 
the legal profession. The bona fide purchaser from the credit grantee is 
usually considered and his interests protected. But the protection of 
consumers against fraud and other predatory practices in marketing 
tends to be glossed over, sometimes by the dubious assertion that this 
can be covered separately in consumer protection legislation.29 
If a law reform commission is to counterbalance the influence of 
appellate adjudication in rule-making and to consider public as well as 
private interests, it is surely vital that some of the commission 
members, and perhaps a majority, should come from disciplines other 
than law, and from background occupations that are not connected 
with the major clientelle of the legal profession. 
Conclusions 
While it has not been the purpose here to produce a catalogue of 
remedial measures, it is suggested that at least the following would be 
helpful. 
28. T. G. ISON, "Small Claims", (1972) 35 Mod. L. Rev. 18. 
29. See, E.G. : Debtor-Creditor Relationships, Part 5, Personal Properly Secutiry, Law 
Reform Commission of British Columbia, Ch. XVI, 1975. 
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1. The curricula of law faculties should include, at least by sample, 
social legislation of a regulatory and service nature. In many 
faculties, this is already the situation. 
2. The study of constitutional and administrative law should include 
topics, such as those mentioned above, that are not covered in the 
literature of litigation. 
3. It would be useful to have a public official, analogous to an 
auditor-general, whose function would be to monitor and prevent 
the production of secret law, and who would have authority to 
direct publication. 
4. An application for mandamus should not be defeated simply 
because the interest of the applicant in the performance of the 
public official is not greater than that of the public at large. 
5. The institution of an ombudsman to deal with private complaints 
against a public officiai could be counter-productive. In any event, 
it is probably less urgent than the need for an ombudsman who 
would be disqualified from dealing with complaints and whose 
function would be to make spot-check reviews. 
6. The role of legislative counsel, as explained above, should be very 
different in the preparation of social legislation from what it is in 
the preparation of private law, and it could require a different 
type of person. 
7. When developing new institutional structures in public law, the 
provinces should be entitled to include in the range of available 
options appointments to a superior court of specialized jurisdic-
tion. 
8. To counterbalance reform through appellate adjudication, law 
reform commissions should include some members, and perhaps 
a majority, from disciplines other than law and from background 
occupations not closely associated with the major clientelle of the 
legal profession. 
The main purpose of the paper, however, has been to explain the 
intrusion of private law in public administration. 
In its substantive rules, public law has developed to a large extent 
independently of private law. But in its institutional, procedural and 
conceptual framework, public law is not sufficiently independent : on 
the contrary, it has suffered from the intrusion of private law. The 
consequences of this intrusion may include the use of secret law, the 
absence of remedies for under-achievement in public administration, 
the production of useless, misleading and wasteful legislation, and a 
failure of the legal system to accommodate the priorities that society 
may wish to assign to public policy objectives. 
